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Marriage and Civil Partnership  
for Same-Sex Couples: 
The International Imperative 
KENNETH MCK. NORRIE*
INTRODUCTION 
Within the single month of November 2004, Saskatchewan became the 
latest Canadian province to accept same-sex marriage,1 South Africa’s 
Supreme Court of Appeal held the limitation of marriage to opposite-
sex couples to be unconstitutional,2 the United Kingdom became the 
latest European country to introduce civil partnerships as an institution 
for same-sex couples analogous to marriage,3 and the government of 
New Zealand presented a Bill to the New Zealand Parliament to do the 
same thing in that country.4 In the 15 years since Denmark became the 
first country in the world to introduce such an institution5 most 
jurisdictions in Western Europe and in Canada, and a handful of states 
in the United States of America, have followed Denmark’s innovation 
and some6 have opened up the institution of marriage itself to same-sex 
couples. The peculiarly North American debate whether civil 
partnership is a second-rate alternative to marriage as a means of 
achieving gay and lesbian equality has not been engaged with elsewhere 
in the world, and it will not be engaged with here. This article intends, 
rather, to explore the remarkable phenomenon that such a debate is 
today one of practical reality rather than hypothetical aspiration. 
It was not many years ago that the idea that same-sex couples 
should have their relationships recognized for any purpose, far less the 
                                                 
 
*  Professor of Law and Head of the Law School, University of Strathclyde, 
Glasgow, Scotland. Fellow of the Royal Society of Edinburgh, Patron of 
OUTRight Scotland. 
1  W.(N.) v. Canada (Attorney General), 2004 SKQB 434, [2004] S.J. No. 669 
(Sask. Q.B). 
2  Fourie and Another v. Minister of Home Affairs and Others, 2005 (3) S.A. 429 
(S.C.A.) [Fourie].  
3  Civil Partnership Act 2004 (U.K.), 2004, c. 33. 
4  Civil Union Bill (N.Z.), No. 149-2, 29 November 2004. 
5  For a discussion of the Danish Registered Partnership Act 1989, see Linda 
Neilsen ‘Family Rights and the “Registered Partnership” in Denmark’ 
(1990) 4 Int’l J.L. & Fam. 297; Morten Broberg ‘The Registered 
Partnership for Same-Sex Couples in Denmark’ (1996) 8 Child & Family 
Law Quarterly 149. 
6  The Netherlands, Belgium and Spain in Europe, Canada and the US state 
of Massachusetts.  The matter is presently before the Constitutional Court 
of South Africa and under political discussion in Switzerland, Sweden, and 
Luxembourg. 
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full range of purposes encompassed within the institution of marriage, 
was met with uncomprehending resistance by policy-makers, legislators 
and judges. Until around the mid 1990s courts across the world were 
reluctant to award custody of children to lesbian mothers because of the 
perceived harm ‘living in the shadow of deviance’ would cause.7 In the 
United Kingdom, a statute declared in 1988, famously and 
ungrammatically, that ‘homosexuality’ was no more than a ‘pretended 
family relationship.’8 Two years previously, the Supreme Court of the 
United States of America had upheld the constitutionality of laws 
criminalizing same-sex sexual activity9 and a series of earlier United 
States cases had consistently upheld the heterospecificity of both 
marriage and other recognized domestic relationships.10 Yet by the end 
of the 1990s court challenges in countries across the western world11 to 
rules of law excluding same-sex couples from benefits, liabilities, and 
opportunities afforded opposite-sex couples were becoming increasingly 
successful, and by the early years of the new century apparently 
irresistible. Advancement by litigation usually creates no more than an 
uneven patchwork of rights and liabilities affecting the subject-matter of 
individual disputes, but the virtual evaporation of judicial ability or 
willingness to oppose recognition of same-sex relationships has given 
legislators the confidence to make comprehensive provision for such 
recognition across the whole gamut of family law. This was, ten years 
ago, unthinkable to opponents, and a dreamy Utopia for proponents, of 
gay and lesbian equality. How could this have changed, so rapidly and 
so universally? 
I  A DECADE OF ADVANCEMENT 
There is no obvious turning point in judicial or legislative attitudes to 
same-sex relationships, but an important moment in time at which to 
start our examination was the adoption in May 1996 of the new post-
                                                 
 
7  See for example J.L.P. v. D.J.P., 643 S.W.2d 865 (Missouri App. Ct.1982); 
Re P (A Minor) (1983), 4 F.L.R. 401 (England); L and L (1983), F.L.C. 91-
353 (Australia); Early v. Early,1989 S.L.T. 114 (Scotland); Bottoms v. 
Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d 276 (Virginia App. Ct. 1994); Van Rooyen v. Van 
Rooyen, 1994 (2) S.A. 325 (South Africa). 
8  Local Government Act 1988 (U.K.), s. 28. 
9  Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) [Bowers]. 
10  See Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Supreme Court of Minnesota 1971); 
Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Kentucky App. Ct. 1973); Singer v. Hara, 
522 P.2d 1187 (Court of Appeals of Washington 1974); Adams v. Howerton, 
673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982); De Santo v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952 (Pa. 
Super. 1984). 
11  It is very different elsewhere. By ‘western world’ I mean, for the purposes of 
this article, North America, Europe, Australasia, and South Africa. 
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apartheid South African Constitution.12 It would be no exaggeration to 
describe this as a milestone in world legal history, for it was the first 
constitutional or human rights13 instrument in the world explicitly 
guaranteeing everyone the right to be free from discrimination on the 
basis of (inter alia) sexual orientation.14 Elsewhere, at around the same 
time, judicial interpretation of existing human rights instruments 
brought sexual orientation within general anti-discrimination rules that 
had previously ignored the issue. So for example the Supreme Court of 
Canada15 held that sexual orientation, though not mentioned in the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, was analogous to those unlawful 
grounds for discrimination expressly listed in section 15 thereof, and so 
was equally a prohibited ground. Similarly, in 1999, the European 
Court of Human Rights held for the first time that sexual orientation 
was ‘intolerable’ to the non-discrimination requirements in Article 14 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights even though it was not 
explicitly mentioned in that article.16  
One of the earliest (and entirely predictable) consequences of 
the adoption of the South African Constitution was that the existing 
(pre-democracy) laws criminalizing male-male sexual activity in South 
Africa were held to be unconstitutional and were struck down.17 This 
decision was explicitly founded on arguments of equality and its 
underlying concept of human dignity. The same result had earlier been 
achieved throughout Europe by a different route: the requirement 
contained in Article 8 of the European Convention to respect 
individuals’ private lives. In Dudgeon v. United Kingdom18 the ban on 
male-male sexual activity that had been maintained in Northern 
Ireland19 was held to breach Article 8 and it is not now possible for a 
member state of either the European Union (twenty-five states) or the 
Council of Europe (forty-six states) to maintain such a blanket ban: 
                                                 
 
12  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, No. 108 of 1996. 
13  Chapter 2 of the Constitution contains a Bill of Rights. 
14  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, No. 108 of 1996, s. 9(3). For a 
discussion of the political imperatives that led to the inclusion of this 
provision in the South African Constitution, see Carl Stychin ‘Constituting 
Sexuality: The Struggle for Sexual Orientation in the South African Bill of 
Rights’ (1996) 23 J. L. & Soc’y 455. 
15  Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513, (1995), 124 D.L.R. (4th) 609; Vriend v. 
Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493, (1998), 156 D.L.R. (4th) 385. 
16  Salgueiro Da Silva Mouta v. Portugal (2001), 31 E.H.R.R. 1055. 
17  National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v. Minister of Justice, [1999] (1) 
S.A. 6 (S. Afr. Const. Ct.). 
18  (1981), 4 E.H.R.R. 149.  
19  Having been repealed in England and Wales by the Sexual Offences Act 1967 
and in Scotland by the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1980. 
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applicant member states to either institution are required to repeal any 
such laws.20 But founding only on private life was insufficient to ensure 
equality, and many European countries maintained differential ages of 
lawful sexual activity. Relying on Article 14 of the European Convention, 
the European Court of Human Rights has more recently held such 
differential ages to amount to unlawful discrimination.21 Even the 
United States of America has now mandated decriminalization and in 
Lawrence v. Texas22 that country’s Supreme Court overruled its own 
earlier decision in Bowers v. Hardwick.23 The majority in Lawrence 
explicitly located its decision within the context of an emerging 
worldwide consensus that adults of the same sex have a right to engage 
with each other in intimate, consensual, sexual activity.24  
Decriminalization opened the door for relationship recognition, 
but that has tended to come in stages. Though it did not seem so at the 
time, claims such as those in M. v. H.,25 where the Supreme Court of 
Canada was faced with a claim by a woman who had been in a same-
sex relationship to access a statute that provided for financial 
readjustment between ex-partners, were actually quite modest: the 
applicant was seeking to be treated in the same way as a member of an 
opposite-sex but unmarried couple. Even when the Supreme Court 
allowed her claim, and federal and provincial legislatures responded 
with comprehensive law reform, the effect was to put same-sex couples 
in the position of unmarried couples. This same result followed in the 
United Kingdom where in Ghaidan v. Mendoza26 the House of Lords 
held that the phrase normally used in British statutes to identify 
unmarried conjugal couples (those ‘living together as husband and 
wife’) had to be interpreted to include same-sex couples, since that was 
the only way to make the statute compatible with the non-
discrimination provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
Comprehensive legislation has not been enacted, but as in Canada 
unmarried same-sex couples can now expect to access all United 
Kingdom statutory rights and responsibilities extended to unmarried 
                                                 
 
20  See Norris v. Ireland (1988), 13 E.H.R.R. 186; Modinos v. Cyprus (1993), 16 
E.H.R.R. 485. 
21  S.L. v. Austria (2003), 37 E.H.R.R. 39; L. & V. v. Austria, (39392/98) [2003] 
E.C.H.R. 20 (9 January 2003); B.B. v. The United Kingdom, (53760/00) 
[2004] E.C.H.R. 64 (10 February 2004); Woditschka and Wilfling v. Austria, 
(69756/01 and 6306/02) (21 October 2004). 
22  123 S.Ct. 2472, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
23  Supra note 9. 
24  Supra note 22 at 2483. 
25  [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3, (1999), 171 D.L.R. (4th) 577. 
26  [2004] U.K.H.L. 30, [2004] 3 W.L.R. 113 (H.L.).  
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opposite-sex couples.27
More demanding claims are made when same-sex couples seek 
to be treated in the same way as opposite-sex married couples. Originally 
such claims were made in the context of attempts to access individual 
marital rights, as typified by claims before the South African courts 
subsequent to the adoption of the 1996 Constitution. In National 
Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v. Minister for Home Affairs,28 in 
order to save the validity of an immigration statute that gave benefits to 
‘spouses’, the words ‘or partner, in a permanent same-sex life 
partnership’ were added. This meant that same-sex couples were to be 
afforded the same protections not of unmarried opposite-sex couples but 
of married opposite-sex couples. The reasoning in this case has been 
consistently followed when same-sex couples have sought to access 
other South African statutes conferring benefits on married couples.29
Once it is accepted that for individual purposes same-sex 
couples should be treated the same way as opposite-sex couples, it 
becomes difficult to resist the argument that they should be so treated 
for the whole range of rights and responsibilities bundled together in the 
hitherto heterosexual relationship of marriage. Baehr v. Lewin30 was the 
first of the modern series of cases in which a United States court held 
that the state had to provide convincing reasons why marriage should be 
limited to opposite-sex couples, and when the state failed to do so31 the 
way was open for same-sex marriage in Hawaii, barred only by 
subsequent constitutional amendment. Nevertheless a ‘reciprocal 
benefits law’32 was passed giving couples, same-sex and opposite-sex, 
who register their relationship with the state a wide variety of benefits 
previously limited to married couples. In Baker v. Vermont33 the Supreme 
                                                 
 
27  M and Langley v. Bradford Metropolitan District Council, [2004] E.W.C.A. 
(Civ.) 1343. The argument has been held by the Scottish Court not to work 
for cases arising before the coming into force of the Human Rights Act 1998: 
Telfer v. Kellock, 2004 S.L.T. 1290. 
28  [2000] (2) S.A. 1 (S. Afr. Const. Ct.). 
29  See for example Satchwell v. President of the Republic of South Africa, [2002] (6) 
S.A. 1 (S. Afr. Const. Ct.) (judicial pensions); Du Toit v. Minister for Welfare 
and Population Development, [2003] (2) S.A. 198 (S. Afr. Const. Ct.) 
(adoption); J. v. Director General, Dept. of Home Affairs, [2003] (5) S.A. 621 (S. 
Afr. Const. Ct.) (co-parenting status). 
30  74 Haw. 530, 852 P.2d 44 (1993). For analysis, see Martin Dupuis ‘The 
Impact of Culture, Society and History on the Legal Process: An Analysis 
of the Legal Status of Same-Sex Relationships in the United States and 
Demark’ (1995) 9 Int’l J.L. & Fam. 86 at 95-8. 
31  Baehr v. Miike, 910 P.2d 112 (Haw. 1996). 
32  An Act Relating to Unmarried Couples 1997, Hawaii Sess. Laws 383. 
33  744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). 
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Court of Vermont held that the legal benefits and protections flowing 
from marriage are so significant that any exclusion from these benefits 
must be justified by public concerns of sufficient weight, cogency and 
authority that the justice of the exclusion cannot seriously be 
questioned. No such concerns were established and the Court held the 
marriage statute to be contrary to the Vermont Constitution: this led to 
the statutory introduction in 2000 of civil unions for same-sex couples.  
The years 2003 and 2004 saw a series of cases in North 
America in which marriage rights were sought not through civil unions, 
as in Vermont and European countries, but through marriage itself. One 
of the first of these cases was Halpern v. Attorney General of Canada34 
where the Ontario Court of Appeal held that ‘[d]enying same-sex 
couples the right to marry perpetuates the … view … that same-sex 
couples are not capable of forming loving and lasting relationships, and 
thus same-sex relationships are not worthy of the same respect and 
recognition as opposite-sex relationships.’35 This approach was followed 
in Massachusetts in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health36 where the 
Supreme Judicial Court held that since the sine qua non of marriage is 
the exclusive and permanent commitment of the partners to each other 
rather than the begetting of children, there was no rational justification 
to limit it to opposite-sex couples. Similar reasoning was adopted by the 
Supreme Court of Appeal in South Africa, which was explicitly founded 
upon both Halpern and Goodridge.37
II  SEEKING EXPLANATIONS 
Just as the year 1999 saw court cases around the western world 
permitting same-sex couples to access non-marital conjugal rights, so 
2004 has seen a variety of both courts and legislatures permitting same-
sex couples to access marital rights, either through civil partnership or 
marriage. This similarity in timing cannot be accidental. The legislative 
and political processes in different countries are clearly being informed 
by, and feeding off, each other. Increased and instantaneous access to 
developments across the world is without doubt facilitating this but it 
does not explain why the movement is virtually all one way. I should 
like to offer four factors, which, taken together, render the developments 
described above as inevitable and ultimately irresistible. 
                                                 
 
34  (2003), 225 D.L.R. (4th) 529 (Ont. C.A.) [Halpern]. See also Hendricks c. 
Québec (Procureur général), [2002] R.J.Q. 2506 (C.S.Q.); EGALE Canada Inc. 
v. Canada (Attorney General) (2003), 225 D.L.R. (4th) 472 (B.C.C.A.); 
Dunbar & Edge v. Yukon (Government of) & Canada (Attorney General), 2004 
Y.K.S.C. 54, 14 July 2004 (Yukon Sup. Ct.); W.(N.), supra note 1. 
35  (2003) 225 D.L.R. (4th) 472 at para. 94. 
36  440 Mass. 309 (2003) [Goodridge]. 
37  Fourie, supra note 2.  
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First, decriminalization has been the spark that lit the fuse, 
sometimes slow burning and sometimes (as in South Africa) extremely 
fast burning, that leads to the explosion of relationship recognition. For 
decriminalization removes the primary justification for treating same-
sex couples less favourably than opposite-sex couples. The criminal law 
creates a status of ‘criminal’ and it is rational and indeed expected that 
the law will regard those with that status as less valued members of 
society than those who are entirely ‘innocent’. Criminalizing behaviour 
that is characteristic of same-sex relationships therefore provides a 
firewall against claims for equal treatment, for the simple (if simplistic) 
reason that all legal systems, rightly, treat criminals less favourably than 
non-criminals. But to remove that firewall exposes that less favourable 
treatment to challenge and obliges those who support it to find other 
justifications.38 Indeed, it has been argued39 that decriminalization is not 
only an essential first step to the legitimization and ultimate full 
recognition of same-sex relationships, but that this first step makes the 
end result inevitable. This argument receives support from the unlikely 
source of Scalia J’s dissenting judgment in Lawrence. He says, 
At the end of its opinion … [the majority in the present 
case] says that the present case ‘does not involve 
whether the government must give formal recognition 
to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to 
enter.’ … Do not believe it. … Today’s opinion 
dismantles the structure of constitutional law that has 
permitted a distinction to be made between 
heterosexual and homosexual unions, insofar as formal 
recognition in marriage is concerned.40  
Second, the late 1990s saw a constitutionalization of family law 
throughout much of the western world at exactly the same time as same-
sex relationships were being accepted as falling within the parameters of 
family law. The importance of this is that constitutionalization provided 
gay and lesbian people with a mechanism to challenge existing 
assumptions flowing from the heteronormativity of ‘family’. Until 
sexual orientation was recognized by the Canadian courts, the South 
African Constitution, and the European Court of Human Rights as an 
illegitimate ground for discrimination, a human rights analysis in these 
countries could not be guaranteed.41 And a human rights analysis, by 
                                                 
 
38  This was recognized in the South African Supreme Court of Appeal by 
Farlam JA in Fourie, supra note 2 at para. 120. 
39  Kees Waaldijk, ‘Civil Developments: Patterns of Reform in the Legal 
Position of Same-Sex Partners in Europe’ (2000) 17 Can. J. Fam. L. 62. 
40  Supra note 22 at 2497-8. 
41  This is apparent in, for example, the House of Lords decision in Fitzpatrick 
v. Sterling Housing Association, [1999] 4 All E.R. 707 (H.L.), which was 
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definition, requires a rational approach divorced from preconceptions, 
assumptions, and stereotyping. It is no accident that the least 
constitutionalized country in the western world, Australia, has been able 
to resist full relationship recognition more effectively than other 
countries.42
Third and following on from this, the search for rational 
justification for treating same-sex couples less favourably than opposite-
sex couples has proved vain. The poverty of arguments brought forward 
by those seeking to maintain the existing position is eloquent testimony 
to their intellectual bankruptcy. The desire to protect marriage, the 
traditional family, and the proper upbringing of children have all been 
placed at the forefront of states’ defences and while these are all 
legitimate concerns, the assertion that they justify discrimination has 
proved easy to dismiss. Neither marriage nor the traditional family is 
demeaned by extending benefits to same-sex couples that had previously 
been extended only to married couples. Madame Justice L’Heureux-
Dubé put it thus some time ago in Canada (Attorney General) v. Mossop, 
‘[i]t is possible to be pro-family without rejecting less traditional family 
forms. It is not anti-family to support protection for non-traditional 
families. The traditional family is not the only family form, and non-
traditional family forms may equally advance true family values.’ 43 Any 
other view is illogical: seeking to enter marriage is not to undermine it, 
but is rather to celebrate its importance.  
The claim that extending equal benefits to same-sex couples is 
an attack on opposite-sex couples is in reality a plea to continue to treat 
opposite-sex couples better than same-sex couples, for only their relative 
and not their absolute position is affected. But such a plea is an assertion 
of superiority, not a justification for acceding to that plea. Underlying 
                                                                                                       
 
decided before the coming into effect of the U.K. Human Rights Act 1998, c. 
42, and which was, therefore, a traditional and entirely limited exercise in 
statutory interpretation. The decision, though of great symbolic importance 
in conferring legitimacy to the concept of same-sex relationships, provided 
little technical precedent (stare decisis) that could be used in later cases. See 
also Telfer, supra note 27. 
42  In October 2004 the Federal Parliament (shortly after the re-election of a 
conservative government) passed the Marriage Amendment Act 2004 (Cth.), 
which both defined ‘marriage’ as a relationship between one man and one 
woman and purported to prohibit the recognition in Australia of any same-
sex marriage validly contracted in another country. 
43  [1993] 1 S.C.R. 554 at 634. Similarly the European Court of Human Rights 
in Marckx v. Belgium (1979), 2 E.H.R.R. 330 at para. 40 said this: ‘The 
Court recognises that support and encouragement of the traditional family 
is in itself legitimate or even praiseworthy. However, in the achievement of 
this end recourse must not be had to measures whose object or result is, as 
in the present case, to prejudice the “illegitimate” family’. 
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the claim may well be the unspoken belief that advantaging opposite-sex 
relationships will encourage gay people to enter opposite-sex 
relationships. That may well have been true in a previous age, but it is 
neither realistic nor acceptable today. The other argument commonly 
raised is that the state has an interest in the upbringing of children in 
opposite-sex relationships, which it is assumed is best for children. This 
argument is illogical (though it is still presented) in jurisdictions that 
tolerate and even facilitate gay parenting (for example through adoption 
or formalizing co-parenting arrangements),44 and even in countries 
where that is not possible the argument is based on stereotyping and 
assumptions made in the absence of evidence that children are indeed 
harmed by being brought up in family surroundings different from the 
norm.45 Protection of children from harm is, of course, a legitimate state 
interest, but courts no longer assume that children are exposed to a 
higher level of risk of harm simply because the adult who is bringing 
them up is gay or lesbian. A further argument, put forward most 
recently in the Supreme Court of Canada46 was that the legal acceptance 
of same-sex marriage is the imposition of a dominant social ethos, in 
itself an interference with the freedom of religious beliefs of those who 
oppose it. The Supreme Court was witheringly dismissive in response: 
‘The mere recognition of the equality rights of one group cannot, in 
itself, constitute a violation of the rights of another.’47 If human rights 
are based on tolerance of differences, a demand to be intolerant has 
credence only when the difference is harmful to society. And that 
argument was lost long ago. 
                                                 
 
44  In Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 at 31 (Vt. 1999), Amestoy CJ, the Court 
pointed out that the state of Vermont allowed adoption by same-sex 
couples and so ‘the exclusion of same-sex couples from the legal protections 
incident to marriage exposes their children to the precise risks that the state 
argues the marriage laws are designed to secure against.’ In M. v. H., supra 
note 25 at para. 92, the Supreme Court of Canada could not understand 
how the alleged state interest in encouraging children to be brought up by 
opposite-sex couples could be rationally related to the statute there at issue, 
which concerned spousal support. In Fourie, supra note 2 at para. 17, 
Cameron JA said that the argument does not work in a country like South 
Africa, where procreative potential is not a defining characteristic of 
conjugal relationships. The European Court of Human Rights rejected, in a 
different context, the notion that marriage is so defined (Goodwin v. United 
Kingdom (2002), 35 E.H.R.R. 18 at para. 98). 
45  In T, Petitioner, [1997] S.L.T. 724, the Scottish Appeal Court permitted a 
child to be adopted by a gay man, the judge at first instance being 
castigated for having refused to do so on the basis of ‘his own 
preconceptions of homosexuality’ rather than on any evidence actually 
presented to the Court. 
46  Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698. 
47  Ibid. at para. 46. 
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Fourth, and not to be underplayed in importance, is the 
increased social acceptability and, crucially, visibility of gay and lesbian 
people in all walks of life, even at the highest levels of government. 
Without this, judges and legislators would have remained comfortable 
in their ignorance of gay and lesbian people and would have felt more 
able to justify a refusal to ameliorate their position on moral grounds. 
Yet moral consensus no longer dictates that gay and lesbian people 
should remain hidden or that they should be cast out from decent 
society. This is not to suggest that society has become amoral in its 
views on family, personal relationships or even the criminal law. 
Rather, human rights have become the new morality. From a starting 
point at the intersection of dignity, privacy, and equality, the thinking 
population accepts the illegitimacy not of same-sex relationships but of 
homophobia.48 Virtually everyone in the western world knows either 
real people or characters from popular culture whose sexual orientation 
is different from their own. That could not have been said twenty years 
ago and its contribution to social comfort has played a not insignificant 
role in shaping the views of policy-makers. 
CONCLUSION 
Decriminalization of same-sex sexual activity removed the firewall 
protecting discriminatory laws from rational analysis; 
constitutionalization of family law provided the mechanism to challenge 
discriminatory laws by applying that rational analysis; the poverty of 
argument utilized by those seeking to defend the status quo made the 
results of many of the cases described above obvious; and the increased 
social acceptance and visibility of gay and lesbian people made the 
developments towards full recognition irresistible. While it is true that in 
the United States constitutional amendments in many states will limit 
marital benefits to opposite-sex couples49 these amendments will 
themselves be open to challenge before the Supreme Court,50 which has 
                                                 
 
48  This was graphically illustrated in the Autumn of 2004 when the European 
Parliament (almost without precedent) rejected a nominee to the new 
European Commission because he expressed the view that homosexuality 
was a ‘sin’. 
49  During the November 2004 presidential election in that country, eleven 
states sought at the same time popular approval, through so-called ‘ballot 
initiatives’, for such constitutional amendments. In Australia (see supra note 
42) the Federal Parliament amended its definition of marriage to exclude 
same-sex relationships at around the same time. 
50  The constitutional amendment prohibiting the passing of anti-
discrimination laws in favour of gay and lesbian people in Colorado traced 
its history to a ballot initiative, but that did not prevent the Supreme Court 
from striking it down (Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)). For a 
discussion, see Angus Campbell & Kenneth Norrie, ‘Homosexual Rights in 
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already refused to deal with a challenge to the Massachusetts legislation 
opening up marriage to same-sex couples.51 Judicial exposure to same-
sex marriage and civil partnership will increase even in resisting 
jurisdictions through the conflict of laws rules;52 this will also expose 
courts to reasoning and juridical policy in other countries and ought, it 
is suggested, to increase judges’ acceptance that there is no danger to 
social well-being from treating gay and lesbian people as well as anyone 
else. The danger to social well-being comes from an insistence on 
maintaining laws discriminating against gay and lesbian people, and the 
relationships they enter into, when the justifications for doing so have 
already been rejected in relation to laws discriminating on the grounds 
of sex and race. 
                                                                                                       
 
Romer v. Evans: Animus Averted’ (1998) 27 Anglo-Am. L. Rev. 285. 
51  Largess v. Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, No. 04.420 (29 November 
2004). 
52  See, already, Rosengarten v. Downes, 802 A.2d 170 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002); 
Cote-Whitacre v. Department of Public Health, 2004 W.L. 2075557 (Mass. 
2004). 
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